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The Evolving Role of Citizens in United
States-Canadian International
Environmental Law Compliance*
NoAH D. HALL**

SYNOPSIS
Citizen participation is critical in environmental law compliance. While citizens often have a major role in advancing compliance with domestic environmental law, citizens have historically
had a much more limited role in international environmental law.
However, a new model is emerging in North America. The role of
citizens in United States-Canadian international environmental
law compliance has expanded greatly over the past several decades. Beginning in the 1970s with increased public participation
in binational governance agreements and expanding in the past
two decades to formal roles in monitoring implementation of international environmental agreements, citizen participation is now
central to the United States-Canadian international environmental legal regime.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, the Westphalian tradition (named after the
Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War over three
centuries ago) of international law allowed only national govern* Portions of this article previously appeared in the UNIVERSITY
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JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM, Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing
Internationaland Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681 (2007) and in the
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW, Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal

Federalism:Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L.
REV. 405 (2006).
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1998 University of Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments and
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Stuntz. This article was presented at the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources Academy of Environmental Law, 4th Worldwide Colloquium, at Pace Law School, New York, and as noted above is adapted in part from the
author's previously published work.
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ments to address international matters.1 Citizens had no direct
role, and their interests could only be considered to the extent that
they were espoused by their government. 2 Nevertheless, relying
exclusively on national governments to address international environmental problems has proved to be inadequate. National governments are extremely reluctant to bring environmental claims
against other nations, as every national government presides over
a house with at least some glass, and the fear of retaliation or
setting undesirable precedents often prevails over the interests of
3
affected citizens.
Relying exclusively on national governments for compliance
also ignores the potentially powerful role that citizens can and do
play in environmental law and policy. The International Joint
Commission ("IJC"), the leading binational environmental governance institution in the United States-Canadian environmental
law regime, has recognized the importance of citizens in advancing compliance:
Public support is crucial to restore and protect the environment.
Active public involvement has had significant consequences for
the environment. Direct public participation drives the development of regulations, conduct of cleanup actions, implementation
of preventive measures and changes in societal attitudes. An
informed and knowledgeable citizenry exerts a powerful influence on policy and decision-makers and allows the public to par4
ticipate in policy development.
One potential approach to empowering citizens in compliance
is supranational adjudication, which allows citizens to bring a
claim against a foreign government in an international tribunal. 5
While this approach has been used in investment and trade agree1. Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798, 798 (2002).
2. See generally, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
3. See David Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making in International Environmental Law, 79 IowA L. REV. 769, 779 (1994).
4. Int'l Joint Comm'n, Ninth Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality:
Achieving the Future-how to do it: Perspective and Orientation(1998), available at
http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/9br/achievee.html [hereinafter Ninth Biennial Report].
5. See generally Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of
Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273 (1997).
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ments, 6 it has not found much support in the environmental arena
where interests of state sovereignty seem to prevail.7 Supranational adjudication, however, is not the only way to give citizens a
role in international environmental compliance and enforcement.
Other approaches have evolved under the United States-Canadian international environmental legal regime that can serve as
examples for other regions.
The international environmental legal regime between the
United States and Canada provides an excellent case study for the
emerging role of citizens in international environmental law compliance. The importance of the two countries' shared natural resources and the significant growth in economic trade between the
two countries highlight the need for compliance with international
environmental law. Further, just as the United States and Canada provided leading examples of the Westphalian approach to
international environmental law in the first half of the twentieth
century with the Boundary Waters Treaty of 19098 and the
landmark Trail Smelter arbitration, 9 the evolving role of citizens
in environmental law compliance could signal a new direction for
international environmental law in the twenty-first century.
For those readers familiar with domestic environmental law
in the United States, the evolving role of citizens in United StatesCanadian international environmental law compliance may seem
modest and ordinary. One of the underlying themes of domestic
environmental law is the role of citizens in penetrating the "iron
triangle" of "private construction and industrial interests, government agencies that service the industry, and congressional delegations that want to attract particular public expenditures into their
backyards." 10 Using this model, international environmental
6. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, sec. B,
Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, 642, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index e.aspx?DetailID=160.
7. See generally John Knox, Citizen Suits in InternationalEnvironmental Law:
The North American Experience, 2 Sixth International Conference on Environmental
Compliance and Enforcement: (2002), available at http://www.inece.org/conf/proceedings2/42-KNOX%20NewALT.pdf.
8. Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit. (for Can.), Jan. 11, 1909, 36
Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
9. United States v. Canada, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1938), reprinted in 33
AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1938) [hereinafter Trail Smelter 1]; United States v. Canada 3 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941), reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941) [hereinafter
Trail Smelter II].
10. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,

AND SOCIETY 400 (3d ed. 2004).
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matters differ in scale but not in the relevant players and goals.
Citizens must have a similar role in international environmental
law to penetrate the international iron triangle of multinational
commercial interests, federal governments engaged in a "race to
the bottom,"" and international governmental authorities that
view commercial interests and the federal governments as their
primary constituencies. From this perspective, the role of citizens
in international environmental law compliance is a natural outgrowth of the role of citizens in domestic environmental law
compliance.
Conversely, a very different perspective comes from the Westphalian tradition of international law. Under this view, international environmental matters and disputes are just one of the
many types of international matters and disputes that can only be
resolved between national governments. 12 National governments
are left to assume the interests of their citizens in international
affairs and, in doing so, they take positions on international environmental matters with all other diplomatic and international interests in mind. From this perspective, the interests and role of
citizens in international environmental law compliance should be
secondary to the interests and role of the respective federal
governments.
This article explores the evolution of the citizens' role in international environmental law compliance by examining the United
States-Canadian international environmental law regime. The
article begins with a brief description of the geographic, environmental, and economic setting that motivates the United StatesCanadian international environmental legal regime. It then ex11. The "race to the bottom" refers to the potential risks for governments to continually lower their environmental protection standards in an effort to attract and
retain businesses and other economic investment. Robert V. Percival, Environmental
Federalism:Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1172
(1995). See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"Rationalefor FederalEnvironmental Regulation,67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Alvin K. Kievorick, The Race to the Bottom in a Federal
System: Lessons from the World of Trade Policy, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 177, 179
(1996).
12. As the leading scholar of international law at the turn of the twentieth century, Lassa Francis Oppenheim (1858-1919), affirmed, "The Law of Nations is a law
for the intercourse of States with one another, not a law for individuals." See LAsSA
OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE 2 (3rd ed. 1920). For a more contemporary discussion of the Westphalian tradition of international law, see Anne-Marie
Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of InternationalLaw is Domestic (or,
The European Way of Law), 47 Harv. Int'l L.J. 327 (2006).
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amines the Boundary Waters Treaty of 190913 and the Trail
Smelter arbitration, 14 in which the United States and Canadian
national governments exercised primary compliance authority in
the Westphalian tradition. 15 The Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 and Trail Smelter arbitration were intended to resolve international environmental disputes between the two federal governments with no formal role for citizens.16 In contrast, more modern
agreements between the United States and Canada demonstrate a
dramatic growth in the role of citizens in achieving compliance
with international environmental law. The Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement ("GLWQA"), 17 the Air Quality Agreement,1 8
and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC") 19 rely heavily on citizens to ensure compliance
and implicitly recognize that the two federal governments may
have more in common with each other than with citizens and
other stakeholders on both sides of the border. 20 This article concludes by examining the future role of citizens in United StatesCanadian international environmental law compliance.
As a final introductory note, it is important to define the key
terms relating to the role of citizens in international environmental law compliance. First, the term "citizen" is defined broadly to
include individual persons, nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs"), and sub-national governments (including American
states and Canadian provinces). In other words, citizens are defined as the same persons, organizations, and governments that
are not a party to traditional formal international treaties and
agreements under the Westphalian tradition. "Compliance" can
be a difficult concept to define in the field of international environ13. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8.
14. Trail Smelter I, supra note 9; Trail Smelter H, supra note 9.

15. See id.
16. See generally Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8; Trail Smelter I, supra
note 9; Trail Smelter H, supra note 9.
17. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1972, 23.1 U.S.T.
301 [hereinafter GLWQA 1972]; Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, as Amended,
U.S.-Can., Nov. 22, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 1384 [hereinafter GLWQA 1978]; Protocol Between the United States of America and Canada, Amending the Agreement of November 22, 1978, U.S.-Can., Nov. 18, 1987, T.I.A.S. No. 11551 [hereinafter GLWQA 1987].
18. Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 676 [hereinafter Air Quality Agreement].
19. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
opened for signature Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC].
20. See generally id.; GLWQA 1972, supra note 17; GLWQA 1978, supra note 17;
GLWQA 1987, supra note 17; Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18.
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mental law. For purposes of this discussion, Professor Edith
Brown Weiss' definition conveys the key aspects of compliance:
Compliance focuses not only on whether implementing measures are in effect, but also on whether there is compliance with
the implementing actions. Compliance also measures the degree to which the actors whose behavior is targeted by the
agreement, whether they be local governmental units, corporations, organizations, or individuals, conform to the implementing measures and obligations. The concept is much broader
than solely that of enforcement, because it draws attention to
ways of bringing countries into compliance with their obliga21
tions, not just on how to handle violations after they occur.

II.

THE UNITED STATES-CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC SETTING

The United States and Canada share a 5,000 mile border (the
longest in North America) that includes 150 rivers and lakes, a
geographic setting that has "provided ample opportunity for the
generation of international environmental disputes." 22 Included
in these boundary lakes and rivers are the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence River, the world's largest surface freshwater system,
containing 95% of the fresh surface water in the United States
and 18 to 20% of the world's supply. 23 About forty million Americans and Canadians rely on the shared boundary waters for their
24
drinking supply.
The shared natural resources between Canada and the
United States are paralleled by a tremendous economic relationship fueled by increased trade. Canada and the United States
21. Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with InternationalEnvironmental Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (1999).
22. Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of International Environmental Disputes in the Context of Canada-UnitedStates Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of
Techniques and Mechanisms, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 247, 249 (1986).
23. See J. David Prince, State Control of Great Lakes Water Diversion, 16 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 107, 108 (1990); see also Great Lakes Comm'n, Toward a Water
Resources Management Decision Support System for the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
River Basin 22 (2003), available at http://www.glc.org/wateruse/wrmdss/finalreport/
pdf/WR-Ch. 1-2003.pdf; LEE BoTTs & BRUCE KRUSHELNICKI, THE GREAT LAKES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAs AND RESOURCE BOOK (3d ed. 1999), available at http:l!
www.epa.gov/glnpo/atlas/glat-chl.html.
24. Int'l Joint Comm'n, Protection of the Waters of the GreatLakes: FinalReport to
the Governments of Canadaand the United States sec. 2, 10 (2000), availableat http:/!
www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/finalreport.html#2.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/6

6

2007]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW COMPLIANCE

137

have "the world's largest and most comprehensive trading relationship," and "[s]ince the implementation of the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement in 1989, two-way trade has tripled."25 In
2004, with over $1.8 billion worth of goods and services crossing
the border every single day, bilateral trade totaled about $680 billion. 26 Canada and the United States also have "one of the world's
In 2004, U.S. direct investlargest investment relationships ....
ment in Canada was worth more than $228 billion, while Canadian direct investment in the United States was close to $165
billion." 2 7 While the causal relationship between increased international trade and transboundary pollution between the two countries is still debated, 28 the significance of the relationship,
economically and environmentally, is clear.
III. THE WESTPHALIAN APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY OF 1909
AND TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION
The two leading authorities from the first part of the twentieth century in the United States-Canadian international environmental law regime display the Westphalian approach to
international environmental law. In both the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 and the Trail Smelter arbitration, citizens had no
formal role in compliance. 2 9 Instead, compliance was the sole domain of the federal governments, which had essentially total discretion in deciding whether to pursue compliance. 30 While these
authorities have provided a substantive foundation for international environmental law, they offered citizens a small role in ensuring compliance.

25. See Canada Dept. of Foreign Affairs & Int'l Trade, The Canada-U.S. Trade
and Investment Partnership, http://geo.international.gc.ca/can-am/main/
tradeand-investment/trade-partnership-en.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2007.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Herman E. Daly, Debate: Does Free Trade Harm the
Environment, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 1993, at 41, 41.
29. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8; Trail Smelter I, supra note 9;
Trail Smelter II, supra note 9.
30. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8; Trail Smelter I, supra note 9;
Trail Smelter II, supra note 9.
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The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909

The Boundary Waters Treaty of 190931 has provided a substantive and governance foundation for addressing transboundary
pollution between the United States and Canada for nearly a century. The origin of the Boundary Waters Treaty dates back to
1903, when the United States and Canada established the International Waterways Commission ("IWC") to address potentially
conflicting rights in the countries' shared waterways. 3 2 The IWC
soon recommended that the United States and Canada adopt legal
principles to govern uses of their shared waters and form an inter33
national body to further advance protection of boundary waters.
In 1907 the IWC proposed a draft treaty, modified during negotiations, which eventually led to the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909. 3 4

The Boundary Waters Treaty primarily "provides for joint
management and cooperation between the United States and Canada for the two countries' shared boundary waters." 35 The
Treaty defines "boundary waters" as
the waters from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways... along which the international
boundary between the United States and... Canada passes.
[sic] including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof, but not including tributary waters which in their natural channels would flow
into such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or waters flowing from
such lakes, rivers, and waterways, or the waters of rivers flow36
ing across the boundary.
While tributary rivers and streams, as well as tributary
groundwaters, are excluded from coverage, the Boundary Waters
Treaty governs four of the five Great Lakes (Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie, and Ontario-as only Lake Michigan sits entirely
31. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8.
32. See Jennifer Woodward, International Pollution Control: The United States
and Canada- The InternationalJoint Commission, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
325, 326 (1988) (citing Int'l Joint Comm'n, Sixth Annual Report on Water Quality 10
(1978)).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism:Interstate Water Management in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 416 (2006); see Woodward, supra note 32, at 327.
36. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, Preliminary Article, 36 Stat. at
2448-49.
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within the United States)-and hundreds of other rivers and
lakes along the United States-Canadian border. 37
According to a leading authority on the history of the Boundary Waters Treaty, navigation and access to boundary waters, 38
not environmental management, was the principle concern at the
time the Treaty was negotiated. 39 Nonetheless, the first draft of
the proposed Treaty included "a provision 'forbidding water pollution having transboundary consequences."' 40 The international
commission that would administer the Treaty would be "vested
with 'such police powers' as might be necessary to ensure respect
for this rule."4 1 The United States Secretary of State objected to
this provision, agreeing only to an anti-pollution provision limited
to the defined boundary and transboundary waters over which the
international commission would not have enforcement
42
jurisdiction.
Thus, Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty simply provides: "It is further agreed that the waters herein defined as
boundary waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not
be polluted on either side to the injury of health or property on the
other."43 There was even opposition to this more limited provision
in the United States Senate when ratification was being debated,
founded on the risk of creating an international water pollution
police power. 4 4 Canada, however, would not consent to the provision's removal and, thus, responded by "assuring the United
States" Senators that the provision "'would be enforced only in
' 45
more serious cases.'
In addition to establishing legal obligations regarding the
shared boundary waters, the Boundary Waters Treaty created the
IJC, a six member investigative and adjudicative body comprised
of political appointees which equally represented both the United
37. Hall, supra note 35, at 417; Woodward, supra note 32, at 327 n.14 ("Boundary

waters other than the Great Lakes include the St. Croix River, between Maine and
New Brunswick, and the Okanagan, Osoyoos, and Skagit Rivers, between Washington and British Columbia.").

38. Stephen J. Toope & Jutta Brunnee, FreshwaterRegimes: The Mandate of the
InternationalJoint Commission, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 273, 277 (1998).
39. Woodward, supra note 32, at 327 (citing F.J.E. Jordan, GreatLakes Pollution:
A Framework for Action, 5 OTTAWA L. REV. 65, 67 (1971)).

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. (quoting Jordan, supra note 39, at 67).
Id. (quoting Jordan, supra note 39, at 67).
Id. (quoting Jordan, supra note 39, at 67).
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV, 36 Stat. at 2450.
Woodward, supra note 32, at 328 (quoting Jordan, supra note 39, at 67-68).
Id. at 328 (quoting Jordan, supra note 39, at 68).
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States and Canada. 46 "[T]he International Joint Commission created by the Boundary Waters Treaty has been commended for its
objectivity and leadership on environmental issues,"47 but it is "severely limited in its ultimate adjudicative power. For a dispute to
be submitted to the International Joint Commission for a binding
arbitral decision, a reference is required by both countries. The
Boundary Waters Treaty specifies that the consent of the U.S.
Senate is required for such action." 48 Consequently, if Canada alleges that industries in the United States are polluting boundary
waters and injuring Canadian citizens' health or the states' property interests, both Canada and the United States Senate, with 49a
two-thirds majority, must agree to submit the matter to the IJC.

As may be expected, this has never occurred in the history of the
50
Boundary Waters Treaty.
"While binding dispute resolution pursuant to article X of the
Boundary Waters Treaty has never occurred, dozens of issues
have been referred to the International Joint Commission for nonbinding investigative reports and studies pursuant to article
IX."5 1 The Boundary Waters Treaty only requires a reference

from one of the countries to invoke this process, however as a matter of custom, this has always been done bilaterally with the support of both countries (consent of the United States Senate is not
required as the United States Secretary of State has this authority).5 2 This bilateral approach has strengthened the credibility of

IJC reports and recommendations and ensured sufficient funding
for its efforts. 53 These non-binding reports and studies, along
with the objective recommendations that are often requested,
have proven valuable in diplomatically resolving numerous international environmental disputes and crafting new policies in both
46. See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451; Hall,
supra note 35, at 417; Woodward, supra note 32, at 328.
47. Hall, supra note 35, at 418 (citing Barry Sadler, The Management of CanadaU.S. Boundary Waters: Retrospect and Prospect, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 359, 370-72
(1986)).
48. Id. (citing Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. X, 36 Stat. at 2452-53);
see Woodward, supra note 32, at 328.
49. Hall, supra note 35, at 418 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 418 n.71; see Woodward, supra note 32, at 329.
52. Hall, supra note 35, at 418 (citing Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art.
IX, 36 Stat. at 2452; Daniel K. DeWitt, Great Words Needed for the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 69 IND. L.J. 299, 308-14 (1993)).
53.

DeWitt, supra note 52, at 313.
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countries to prevent environmental harms from occurring. 5 4 As
such, the IJC enjoys a well-deserved reputation for objective work,
supported by the best science available and free from political biases, and serves as an important source of information for both
the public and decision-makers in the United States and Canada. 5 5 However, under the terms of the Boundary Waters
Treaty, the IJC does not give citizens any role in ensuring compliance with the substantive provisions of the treaty. 56
B.

The Trail Smelter Arbitration

The most famous example of the IJC's role in arbitration and
dispute resolution is the Trail Smelter arbitration 7 This classic
arbitration decision has been described as "having laid out the
foundations of international environmental law, at least regarding transfrontier pollution."5 8 It remains "the only decision of an
international court or tribunal that deals specifically, and on the
merits, with transfrontier pollution."5 9 However, they also provide an example of traditional international adjudication between
national governments with no role for affected or interested
60
citizens.
The facts of the dispute are best told by quoting directly from
the final 1941 arbitration decision:
In 1896, a smelter was started under American auspices
near the locality known as Trail [in British Columbia, located on
the Columbia River about seven miles north of the United
States border and Washington State.] In 1906, the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, Limited ...
acquired the smelter plant at Trail ....
Since that time, the
Canadian company, without interruption, has operated the
54. See generally id. at 318-23.
55. Hall, supra note 35, at 418 n.72 ("Several commentators have noted the importance of the Boundary Waters Treaty and the International Joint Commission."
(citing Prince, supra note 23, at 149-51; Sadler, supra note 47, at 370-72; Sharon A.
Williams, Public InternationalLaw and Water Quality Management in a Common
DrainageBasin: The Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 155, 178-79 (1986)).
But cf DeWitt, supra note 52, at 313-23 (noting the IJC's objectivity and independence, but limited and obscure role as a tool of the governments)).
56. See generally Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8.
57. Trail Smelter I, supra note 9; Trial Smelter 1I, supra note 9.
58.

ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

107

(1991).
59.

EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY

257 (1998).
60. See generally id.
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Smelter, and from time to time has greatly added to the plant
until it has become one of the best and largest equipped smelting plants on the American continent. In 1925 and 1927, two
stacks of the plant were erected to 409 feet in height and the
Smelter greatly increased its daily smelting of zinc and lead
ores. This increased production resulted in more sulphur dioxide fumes and higher concentration being emitted into the air.
In 1916, about 5,000 tons of sulphur per month were emitted; in
1924, about 4,700 tons; in 1926, about 9,000 tons-an amount
which rose near to 10,000 tons per month in 1930. In other
words, about 300-350 tons of sulphur were emitted daily in
1930....
From 1925, at least, to 1937, damage occurred [to private
farms and timber lands] in the State of Washington resulting
from the sulphur dioxide emitted from the Trail Smelter .... 61
Despite the obvious severity of the pollution and the makings
of a common law nuisance claim, the Washington landowners
faced procedural obstacles in pursuing relief through domestic litigation in the courts of both British Columbia and Washington
State:
Lawyers at the time were generally of the view that British Columbia courts would decline to assert jurisdiction in any action
to recover for the property damage in Washington because of the
rule announced by the House of Lords in British South Africa
Company v. Companhia de Mogambique, 1893 A.C. 602. That
case held that suits for damage to foreign lands are local actions
and must be brought in the state where the land is located. Yet
the Washington property owners would fare no better in that
state since at the time it had no long-arm statute that would
have permitted a Washington court to assert jurisdiction over
62
the Canadian smelter.
With no domestic litigation options, the United States intervened on behalf of the Washington State landowners under the
legal construct of espousal, in which the nation state takes on an
international claim on behalf of its private citizens. 6 3 The decision
of the United States to take on the claim of its citizens is significant, as the citizens would have had no other options for legal re61. Trail Smelter II, supra note 9, at 1945, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684,
692-93 (1941).
62. WEISS ET AL., supra note 59, at 246.
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 902, cmt. i (1987).
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lief. In 1928, the two countries agreed to refer the matter to the
IJC for a factual study of the liabilities and damages. 64 In 1931
the IJC determined that the United States had suffered $350,000
(equivalent to approximately $4.67 million in 200665) in accrued
damages through January 1, 1932, and recommended pollution
controls to reduce future harm. 66 Despite the IJC report, in 1933,
the United States was still not satisfied and again complained to
the Canadian Government that "existing conditions were entirely
67
unsatisfactory and that damage was still occurring."
The subsequent diplomatic negotiations led to the United
States and Canada signing and ratifying a Convention in 1935.68
Through the Convention, the two countries agreed to refer the
matter to a three-member arbitration tribunal composed of an
American, a Canadian, and an independent chairman (a Belgian
national was ultimately appointed). 6 9 The arbitration tribunal
was charged with first determining whether damages caused by
Trail Smelter continued to occur after January 1, 1932 and, if so,
what indemnity should be paid. 70 Under the Convention, Canada
had already agreed to pay the United States $350,000 for damages
prior to 1932, based on the findings of the IJC.71 The arbitration
tribunal addressed this first question in its 1938 decision (Trail
Smelter I), determining that the damages caused by the Canadian
smelter to properties in Washington State from 1932 to 1937
amounted to $78,00072 (equivalent to approximately $1.1 million
in 200673).
The arbitration tribunal's more difficult, and ultimately more
significant charge, was to decide whether the Canadian "[s]melter
64. See Trail Smelter I, supra note 9, at 1918, reprintedin 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182,

191 (1938).
65. See Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Consumer Price Index Calculator,
http://minneapolisfed.org/Research/data/us/calc/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis].
66. See Trail Smelter I, supra note 9, at 1918-19, reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L.
182, 191-92 (1938).
67. Id. at 1919, reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182, 192 (1938).
68. Convention Relative to the Establishment of a Tribunal to Decide Questions
of Indemnity and Future Regime Arising from the Operation of Smelter at Trail, British Columbia, U.S.-Can., Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3245 [hereinafter Convention].
69. See id. art. II, 49 Stat. at 3246; Trail Smelter I, supra note 9, at 1911, reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182, 183 (1938).
70. See Convention, supra note 68, art. III, 49 Stat. at 3246.
71. See id. art. I, 49 Stat. at 3246.
72. See Trail Smelter I, supra note 9, at 1933, reprintedin 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182,
208 (1938).
73. See Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, supra note 65.
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should be required to refrain from causing damage in the State of
Washington in the future," and what "measures or regime, if any,
should be adopted or maintained by the ...[simelter, in addition
to future "indemnity or compensation. '74 To answer these questions, the tribunal was directed to "apply the law and practice followed in dealing with cognate questions in the United States of
America as well as International Law and Practice, and... give
consideration to the desire of the High Contracting Parties to
75
reach a solution just to all parties concerned."
Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal's 1941 decision (Trail
Smelter II) answered these questions and established a historic
precedent for international transboundary pollution law. 76 The
tribunal first concluded that there was no need to chose between
the law of the United States or international law to decide the
case, "as the law followed in the United States in dealing with the
quasi-sovereign rights of the States of the Union, in the matter of
[transboundary] pollution, whilst more definite, [is] in conformity
with the general rules of international law." 77 The tribunal cited
a leading international law authority: "As Professor Eagleton puts
it . . . 'A State owes at all times a duty to protect other States
against injurious acts by individuals from within its
78
jurisdiction.'"
The tribunal supplemented this general rule with a comprehensive summary of the United States Supreme Court's decisions
regarding interstate transboundary pollution, including cases
both between two sovereign states and between a state and local
governments or private parties (such as cities and mining companies). 79 Taking the decisions as a whole, the tribunal stated the
following principles for transboundary pollution disputes:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the
74. Convention, supra note 68, art. III, 49 Stat. at 3246.
75. Id. art. IV, 49 Stat. at 3246.
76. See generally Trail Smelter II, supra note 9.
77. Id. at 1963, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 713 (1941).
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1964-65, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 714-16 (1941) (citing
New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v. Tenn.
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902)).
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cause is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence. 8 0
The tribunal further held that "the Dominion of Canada is responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail
Smelter."8 1 Therefore, it is "the duty of the Government of the
Dominion of Canada to see to it that this conduct should be in
conformity with the obligation of the Dominion under interna2
tional law as herein determined."
Applying these principles to the dispute at hand, the tribunal
required the Trail Smelter to "refrain from causing any damage
through fumes in the State of Washington."8 3 The tribunal specifically noted that such damage would be actionable under United
States law in a suit between private individuals.8 4 Further, the
tribunal ordered a detailed management regime and regulations
for the smelter to prevent sulphur dioxide emissions from reaching levels that cause property damage in Washington State.8 5 The
tribunal also indicated that it would allow future claims for dam86
ages that occur, despite the imposed management regime.
The liability rule of the Trail Smelter arbitration is a defining
principle of international environmental law. It was incorporated
into the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm Declaration of 1972, which provides in Principle 21
that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of international law, the sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of na8 7
tional jurisdiction.
80. Id. at 1965, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716 (1941).
81. Id., reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 716-17 (1941).
82. Id. at 1966, reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684, 717 (1941).
83. Id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See Trail Smelter II, supra note 9, at 1966-81, reprintedin 35 AM. J. INTL L.
684, 717 (1941).
87. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, at
Princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 and Corr. 1 (June 16, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416, 1420 (1972), available at http://www.unep.org/dpdl/Law/PDF/StockholmDeclaration.pdf.
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This principle has since been reaffirmed in numerous other
charters and declarations, most notably in Principle 2 of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio Declaration of 1992,88 and in section 601(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.8 9
It should also be noted that while the principle is often declared, it
has not been applied so as to actually prohibit all transboundary
harm. 90 Instead, the principle is often considered to be limited to
"significant or substantial" transboundary harm, and perhaps further limited to include only a duty by the source state to "undertake due diligence" to prevent significant or substantial
transboundary pollution harms. 9 1
For purposes of this discussion, however, it is the process that
produced the ruling that is important. Both countries assumed
the claims and liabilities of their private citizens and corporations,
and sought to resolve the dispute through a diplomatic process
that culminated in formal international tribunal arbitration. This
commitment to environmental diplomacy is especially noteworthy
given the pressing international concerns in the decade before
World War II. The unusual willingness of the national governments to address an international environmental problem
through binding arbitration is most remarkable and has not since
been repeated in United States-Canadian history. Instead of giving rise to a legal regime of international arbitration with the interests of citizens represented by national governments, the Trail
Smelter arbitration remains a historical anomaly. International
environmental law soon took a back seat to World War II, the Cold
War, and the economic and social issues of the 1950s and 1960s.
When international environmental law came back in the 1970s, it
took a very different form and relied far more on citizens for
compliance.
88. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (June 14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 (1992).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 601(1) (1987) ("A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to
the extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its
jurisdiction or control . . .are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the
environment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.").
90. See John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of Transboundary Environmental
Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 293 (2002) ("Although some scholars have
still argued that all transboundary environmental harm should be presumptively unlawful, the idea that Principal 21 [of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration] prohibits all
transboundary harm has generally been rejected.").
91. Id. at 293-94.
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PROVIDING A ROLE FOR CITIZEN
COMPLIANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REGIME: MODERN
UNITED STATES-CANADIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS

While the Boundary Waters Treaty and Trail Smelter arbitration were responses to disputes between United States and Canadian interests, modern environmental agreements between the
United States and Canada are responses to binational environmental problems raised by citizens working together on both sides
of the border. The GLWQA, 9 2 the Air Quality Agreement, 9 3 and
the NAAEC 9 4 mark a clear break from the Westphalian tradition
of international law. These agreements were motivated by environmental concerns shared by citizens from both countries. 95 As a
result, when viewed together and historically, the agreements
show a clear evolution of the role of citizens in the international
environmental law regime.
A.

The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement

In the years following World War II, citizens and scientists
became increasingly alarmed about water pollution in the Great
Lakes. In response to these concerns, the United States and Canada issued a joint reference to the IJC in 1964 regarding pollution in Lakes Erie and Ontario. 96 It took the IJC nearly seven
years, but in 1970 it issued a report recommending new water
quality control programs and the need for a new agreement for
cooperative action in response to pollution. 97 Two years of negotiations followed, and in 1972 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and
98
President Richard Nixon signed the GLWQA.
As stated in the 1972 GLWQA, the two countries were
[s]eriously concerned about the grave deterioration of water
quality on each side of the boundary to an extent that is causing
92. See generally GLWQA 1972, supra note 17; GLWQA 1978, supra note 17;
GLWQA 1987, supra note 17.
93. See generally Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18.
94. See generally NAAEC, supra note 19.
95. See generally id.; GLWQA 1972, supra note 17; GLWQA 1978, supra note 17;
GLWQA 1987, supra note 17; Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18.
96. Int'l Joint Comm'n Pollution of Lakes Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St. Lawrence River 3 (1971).
97. See id. at 1, 9.
98. GLWQA 1972, supra note 17, at 301.
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injury to health and property on the other side, as described in
the 1970 report of the International Joint Commission on Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section of
the St. Lawrence River. 99
The 1972 GLWQA sets forth general10 0 and specific water quality
objectives,' 0 1 provides for programs and other measures that are
directed toward the achievement of the water quality objectives,10 2 and defines the powers, responsibilities and functions of
the IJC.10 3 However, the two federal governments (specifically
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Environment Canada), not the IJC, have primary responsibility for implementing
the programs provided for and for achieving the objectives of the
04
GLWQA.
The 1972 GLWQA focused on phosphorous pollution, and as
sewage treatment improved and phosphate detergent bans were
adopted in both countries, progress was made towards reducing
the transboundary harms from this pollutant.1 0 5 This success was
tempered by new scientific discoveries and resulting public pressure to address persistent organic chemicals that "were already
affecting the health of wildlife and could be a threat to human
health." 10 6 In response, the United States and Canada amended
the GLWQA in 1978 with a new purpose:
to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem. In
order to achieve this purpose, the Parties agree to make a maximum effort to . . .eliminate or reduce to the maximum extent

practicable the discharge of pollutants into the Great Lakes
System.
Consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, it is the
policy of the Parties that:

Id. at 302.
Id. art. II, at 304.
Id. art. III, at 304-05.
Id. art V, at 305-08.
Id. art. VI, at 308-09.
See generally GLWQA 1972, supra note 17.
Joseph DePinto & Thomas C. Young, Great Lakes Quality Improvement,
ENvTL. Sci. & TECH. 20, n.8 (1986).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106. LEE BoTTs & PAUL MULDOON, EVOLUTION OF THE GREAT LAKEs WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT 27 (2005).
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(a) The discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts be
prohibited and the discharge of any or all persistent toxic
substances be virtually eliminated.107
Nine years later the parties again revised the GLWQA after a
comprehensive review and signed the 1987 Protocol. 0 8 The 1987
Protocol created provisions for "Remedial Action Plans" for "Areas
of Concern" and "Lakewide Management Plans" which focused on
critical pollutants and drew upon broad local community involvement.1 0 9 While the Agreement has not been revised since 1987,
the two countries and the IJC recently conducted a comprehensive
review of the GLWQA to address emerging threats to the health of
the Great Lakes. 1 0
Despite the lofty goals of the GLWQA, its implementation has
been undermined by its sub-treaty status (it was never subject to
approval in the United States Senate) and its failure to contain
enforcement provisions."' Attempts by citizens to enforce the
GLWQA in court have not been particularly successful. 1 2 However, while the GLWQA lacks legally enforceable status in domestic courts, it has given citizens an increased role in shaping policy
3
to address transboundary pollution in the Great Lakes."
Prior to the GLWQA, in 1972 the IJC held public hearings on
1 4
specific topics, but essentially conducted its business in private.
Under increased citizen pressure resulting from the growing environmental movement, the GLWQA changed this custom and
opened the IJC up to the public. 1 5 The increased public involvement in the implementation of the GLWQA became one of its most
107. GLWQA 1978, supra note 17, art. II, 30 U.S.T. at 1387.
108. GLWQA 1987, supra note 17.
109. See id. art. VIII, at 7-12.
110. See Press Release, Int'l Joint Comm'n, IJC Recommends a New Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement for the 21st Century (Oct. 26, 2006), http://www.ijc.org/rel/
news/061024_e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2006).
111. See generally Edith Brown Weiss, Symposium on Prevention of Groundwater
Contamination in the Great Lakes Region: New Directionsfor the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement: A Commentary, 65 CHI-KENT L. REV. 375, 377 (1989).
112. See Lake Erie Alliance for the Prot. of Coastal Corridor v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 526 F. Supp. 1063, 1077 (D. Pa. 1981); see also Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA,
115 F.3d 979, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
113. David L. Markell, Governance of InternationalInstitutions: A Review of the
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submissions
Process, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 759, 659-760 (2005).
114. See BoTTs & MULDOON, supra note 106, at 39.
115. See id. at 39-40.
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significant results. 116 The IJC affirmed its commitment to public
participation in its Ninth Biennial Report:
The public's right and ability to participate in governmental
processes and environmental decisions that affect it must be
sustained and nurtured.
The Commission urges governments to continue to effectively communicate information that the public needs and has
publicly
come to expect, and to provide opportunities to be1 held
17
accountable for their work under the Agreement.
The increased opportunity for public participation in decisionmaking compensates, to some extent, for the GLWQA's failure to
contain specific enforcement provisions. With increased public
participation comes increased accountability on the part of both
federal governments to comply with their joint responsibilities
under the GLWQA. Equally important, the GLWQA has helped
create an informed and engaged citizenry on both sides of the border, which has led to the increased role for citizen enforcement
discussed in the following sections.
B.

The Air Quality Agreement

The 1991 Air Quality Agreement between the United States
and Canada 18 was executed primarily in response to growing concerns over acid rain from sulfur dioxide air pollution; the agreement, however, covers all forms of transboundary air pollution
between the two countries.1 1 9 The Air Quality Agreement was the
product of a decade of diplomatic negotiations, commitments, and
studies, formally originating with a 1980 Memorandum of Intent
Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution.1 20 When the United
States aggressively addressed its acid rain pollution in the 1990

116. See id. at 39; see also THOMAS

PRINCEN & MArlHIAs FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL

NGOs IN WORLD POLITICs 71 (1994).

117.
118.
119.
120.
Aug. 5,

Ninth Biennial Report, supra note 4.
Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18.
Id. art. 1(2), 30 I.L.M. at 679.
Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution, U.S.-Can.,
1980, 20 I.L.M. 690.
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Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 12 1 the foundation for a bilateral
1 22
agreement with Canada was laid.
The Air Quality Agreement begins with both countries stating
their mutual "[d]esir[e] that emissions of air pollutants from
sources within their countries not result in significant transboundary air pollution."' 23 The countries reaffirm their commitment to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration and:
their tradition of environmental cooperation as reflected in the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, the Trail Smelter Arbitration
of 1941, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, as
amended, the Memorandum of Intent Concerning Transboundary Air Pollution of 1980,

. .

. [and] the ECE [Economic

Commission for Europe] Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979124 [to which both the United
'
States and Canada are parties]. 125

While the scope of the Air Quality Agreement includes all
transboundary air pollution, it contains specific objectives for each
country for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions limitations. 1 26 The United States committed to the emissions limitations that the federal government had already imposed
domestically under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, and Canada's commitments essentially followed its domestic goals. 12 7
The Air Quality Agreement further provides for assessment, noti121. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7700 (2000)). The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments:
recognize[d] that acid rain 'represents a threat to natural resources, ecosystems, materials, visibility, and public health,' that it is a problem of
'international significance,' that reductions in sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions would curb acid rain, that technology is currently
available to control these emissions, and that delaying such remedies
would adversely affect current and future generations.
Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-CanadaAir Quality Agreement: A Framework for
Addressing TransboundaryAir Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 421, 443-44
(1993) (quoting 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104
Stat. 2399, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7651).
122. Roelofs, supra note 121, at 443-44 ("By recognizing the intricate problems of
acid rain, [the 1990 Clean Air Act] amendments became the foundation for a bilateral
agreement with Canada on transboundary air pollution.").
123. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18, 30 I.L.M. at 678.
124. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 10541, 18 I.L.M. 1442, available at http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/
full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdf.
125. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18, 30 I.L.M. at 678.
126. Id. annex 1, 30 I.L.M. at 685-90.
127. Id.
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fication, and mitigation of transboundary air pollution. 128 These
duties are complemented by cooperative scientific and technical
activities and research, 12 9 along with the coordinated exchange of
13 0
information.
For purposes of this discussion, however, it is the citizen participation provisions of the Air Quality Agreement that are most
noteworthy. The Air Quality Agreement relies on both a newly
established "bilateral Air Quality Committee" 13 1 and the IJC for
implementation.132 While both of these bodies are comprised of
representatives of the respective governments, the Air Quality
Agreement requires both bodies to allow significant public participation in implementing their duties. 13 3 The Air Quality Committee is responsible for reviewing implementation progress and
submitting biannual progress reports to the parties and the
IJC.' 3 4 The Air Quality Agreement specifically requires the Committee to release "each progress report to the public after its submission to the Parties." 3 5
As with the GLWQA, the Air Quality Agreement enlists the
IJC as an implementing institution. 36 Building on the increased
role that citizens played in the IJC's work on the GLWQA, the Air
Quality Agreement mandates a role for citizens in the IJC's duties. 137 The IJC is required "to invite comments, including
through public hearings as appropriate, on each progress report
prepared by the Air Quality Committee pursuant to Article
VIII."' 38 The IJC must then submit to the two countries "a synthesis of the views" of the public,' 39 and release this synthesis to
the public after submission to the two governments. 40 As one
commentator has noted, the mandated role for citizens "may pose
some time costs, but such costs are outweighed by the benefits of
128. Id. art. V, 30 I.L.M. at 680-81.
129. Id. art. VI, 30 I.L.M. at 681.
130. Id. art. VII, 30 I.L.M. at 681.
131. Id. art. VIII, 30 I.L.M. at 682.
132. Id. art. IX, 30 I.L.M. at 682.
133. Id. arts. VIII, IX, 30 I.L.M. at 682; see Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8,
art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451.
134. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18, arts. VIII, IX, 30 I.L.M. at 682.
135. Id. art. VIII(2)(d), 30 I.L.M. at 682.
136. Id. art. IX(1), 30 I.L.M. at 682.
137. See id. art. IX, 30 I.L.M. at 682.
138. Id. art. IX(1)(a), 30 I.L.M. at 682.
139. Id. art. IX(1)(b), 30 I.L.M. at 682.
140. Id. art. IX(1)(c), 30 I.L.M. at 682.
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public participation and oversight in the implementation of the
14 1
[Air Quality] Agreement."
The Air Quality Agreement further requires that "the Parties
shall, as appropriate, consult with State or Provincial Governments, interested organizations, and the public" in implementing
the agreement. 142 This "provision provides a means by which...
state or provincial governments, citizens, and interest groups, can
exert substantial pressure on the [parties] to implement and effectuate the objectives of the agreement."'14 3 Beyond the substance of
the Air Quality Agreement, this may be its greatest significance,
as none of the previous environmental agreements and treaties
between the United States and Canada required public participation in reviewing and assessing compliance.
C.

The North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation

The NAAEC is a trilateral agreement between the United
States, Canada, and Mexico.' 4 4 It was intended to address environmental concerns related to the North America Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") among the same three countries. 45 Environmentalists were concerned that increased trade under NAFTA
would "overwhelm environmental infrastructure, especially along
the U.S.-Mexico border." 46 They were further concerned that
by removing barriers to foreign investment in Mexico, NAFTA
would lure companies to move there in search of a "pollution
haven," and thereby contribute to the pollution of the Mexican
environment, take jobs from U.S. workers, and put pressure on
all three North American countries to lower their environmental standards in a "race to the bottom.' 4 7
While Mexico's environmental laws were essentially
equivalent to those of the United States, the perceived problem
was inadequate compliance and enforcement. 48
141.

Roelofs, supra note 121, at 449.

142. Air Quality Agreement, supra note 18, art. XIV, 30 I.L.M. at 684.
143. Roelofs, supra note 121, at 449.
144. NAAEC, supra note 19.
145. See John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with InternationalEnvironmental Law: The Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 53 (2001).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 54.
148. Id.
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To address these concerns, the NAAEC requires each party to
"effectively enforce its environmental laws and regulations." 14 9
The agreement established the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation ("NACEC"), 15 0 composed of a Council
of representatives of the three parties, 1 51 a Secretariat with professional staff,1 52 and a Joint Public Advisory Committee
("JPAC").1 53 The JPAC is just one mechanism for public participation under the NAAEC, which states that one of its explicit
objectives is to "promote transparency and public participation in
the development of environmental laws, regulations and policies."1 5 4 Among the many notable provisions of the NAAEC, the
citizen submission procedure provides the most direct role for citizens to promote compliance.
The NAAEC's citizen submission procedure gives members of
the public a direct means for addressing a specific concern related
to environmental enforcement in one of the three NAFTA countries.1 55 Submissions may be made to the NACEC Secretariat by
"any non-governmental organization or person asserting that a
Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law."' 5 6
For the Secretariat to consider a submission, the submission must
first meet some basic requirements regarding format and sufficiency of information, "be aimed at promoting enforcement rather
than at harassing industry," and "indicate[] that the matter has
been communicated in writing to the relevant authorities of the
157
Party and indicate[ I the Party's response, if any."
Assuming these requirements are met, the Secretariat may
then request a response from the government party concerned,
taking into account the following Article 14(2) factors:
(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization
making the submission;
(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions, raises matters whose further study in this process would
advance the goals of this Agreement;
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

NAAEC, supra note 19, art. 5(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1483-84.
Id. art. 8, 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
Id. art. 9(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1485.
Id. art 11(1)-(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1487.
Id. art. 16, 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
Id. art. 1(h), 32 I.L.M. at 1483.
Id. arts. 14, 15, 32 I.L.M. 1488-89.
Id. art. 14(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
Id. art. 14(1)(a)-(e), 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
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(c) private remedies available under the Party's law have been
pursued; and
(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media

reports. 158
When the Secretariat requests a party's response, it forwards
"to the Party a copy of the submission and any supporting information provided with the submission." 159 The party must then
promptly (within thirty days) "advise the Secretariat ... [ifi the
matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding, in which case the Secretariat shall proceed no further."' 60
The party may also reply with any other information, including
information relating to "whether the matter was previously the
subject of a judicial or administrative proceeding, and whether
private remedies . . .are available . . .and . . .have been pur-

sued." 16 1 The Secretariat then considers both the citizen submission and the party's response, and recommends to the Council
(essentially the three parties) whether a "factual record" should be
prepared. 16 2 While the NAAEC offers no additional guidance for
the Secretariat's recommendation as to whether a factual record
should be prepared, the type of information suggested for the
party's response suggests that the Secretariat and NACEC will
only take a matter if any available domestic remedies have been
pursued. This would be both efficient and respectful of state sovereignty and domestic legal processes.
The ultimate decision on whether to prepare a factual record
of submission rests not with the Secretariat but with the Council,
which must authorize the factual record with a two-thirds vote.163
Requiring a two-thirds vote, rather than a unanimous vote, allows
the Council to authorize preparation of a factual record over the
objections of the party the complaint is made against. 16 4 However, the decision to prepare factual records ultimately rests with
the same governments that may be failing to effectively enforce
the underlying laws. 16 5 The federal government parties (acting as
the Council) have kept for themselves the final decision as to
158. Id. art. 14(2), 32 I.L.M. at 1488.

159. Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. art. 14(3)(a), 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
Id. art. 14(3)(b), 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
Id. art. 15(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1488.
Markell, supra note 113, at 765-66.
Id. at 766.
See generally id. at 783-93.
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whether a factual record should be prepared. 16 6 Recognizing this
potential conflict, the JPAC has suggested that the Council could
"'re-establish public confidence' in the citizen submissions process
... by making 'every effort to ensure that the independence of the
16 7
Secretariat is maintained."'
If the Council authorizes preparation of a factual record, the
Secretariat conducts an investigation, gathering information from
the public, the JPAC, the party, and independent experts.1 68 The
Secretariat then produces a draft factual record for the Council's
comments. 16 9 Once finalized, the factual record may be made public by a two-thirds majority vote of the Council. 1 70 As the name
implies, factual records are neither conclusory nor legally enforceable. However, they provide documented and credible information
regarding an alleged failure to effectively enforce environmental
law and are open to citizens of any party country. Professor Kal
Raustiala describes this as "primarily an information-forcing
mechanism. There are no direct sanctions employed; rather, the
' 71
NAAEC employs a regulatory strategy of 'sunshine."
While the NAAEC provides an expanded role for citizens, a
recent submission demonstrates that citizens are still unable to
ultimately force compliance with international environmental
commitments on unwilling federal governments. The citizen submission was made by both Canadian and U.S. environmental
NGOs and citizens to address the United States' and Canada's
lack of enforcement of their obligations to prevent transboundary
pollution under the Boundary Waters Treaty in connection with
the diversion of water from Devils Lake in North Dakota into
Lake Winnipeg and other Canadian waters.1 72 According to the
submission:

166. See generally id. at 765.

167. Id. at 790 (quoting Joint Public Advisory Committee, Advice to Council No.
04-03 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/Advice-0403_en.pdf).
168. See NAAEC, supra note 19, arts. 15(4), 21(1), 32 I.L.M. at 1488-89, 1490.
169. Id. art. 15(5), 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
170. Id. art. 15(7), 32 I.L.M. at 1489.
171. Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in NAAEC, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
256, 261 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).
172. Submission of Friends of the Earth Canada et al., to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation at 1, SEM-06-002 (Devils Lake), (Mar. 24, 2006), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/06-2-SUB-en.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol24/iss1/6

26

2007]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW COMPLIANCE

157

This is a cross-border issue that arises out of the construction
and operation by the state of North Dakota of an outlet to drain
water from Devils Lakes in the Sheyenne River, the Red River
Basin, Lake Winnipeg, and ultimately the broader Hudson Bay
drainage system. The project threatens direct and negative environmental impacts on Canadian waters, including the introduction of biological pollutants such as invasive species....
The construction of the artificial outlet from Devils Lake is an
unlawful cause of transboundary pollution, contrary to [Boundary Waters] Treaty obligations. Both the U.S. and Canadian
governments have a duty to resolve the dispute at the International Joint Commission.173
The Secretariat responded by first issuing a determination
that the submission did not satisfy the requirements of Article
14(1).174 The Secretariat determined that the Boundary Waters
Treaty provisions on which the submission was based (Articles IX
and X) do not impose a specific, enforceable legal mandate to address questions regarding transboundary water pollution through
referral to the IJC as required by the NAAEC:
The Boundary Waters Treaty . . . does not mandate referral to
the IJC whenever a government has reason to believe that
transboundary water pollution is occurring.... Thus, even if
factual information were to indicate that because of the Devils
Lake outlet, "boundary waters and waters flowing across the
boundary" from North Dakota into Canada are "polluted ... to
the injury of health or property" in Canada, in apparent violation of Article IV of the treaty, the mandate to refer the matter
175
to the IJC does not automatically follow.
The concerned Canadian and U.S. environmental NGOs and
citizens resubmitted a revised petition, alleging that the transboundary pollution violates Article IV of the Boundary Waters
Treaty. 17 6 The Secretariat again determined that the submission
did not satisfy the requirements of Article 14(1) and dismissed the
173. Id.
174. Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, at 5, SEM-06-002 (Devils Lake) (June 8, 2006),
available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/06-2-DET14-1-en.pdf.
175. Id.
176. Submission of Friends of the Earth Canada et al., to the Commission for Environmental Cooperation at 1, SEM-06-002 (Devils Lake), (July 7, 2006), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/06-2-RSUB-en.pdf.
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petition. 17 7 The Secretariat's determination was based, in part, on
the finding that the Boundary Waters Treaty does not provide a
role for citizens in ensuring compliance with the Treaty's substan178
tive provisions.
The Secretariat's determination demonstrates the inherent
weaknesses in the Westphalian approach of the Boundary Waters
Treaty. While the Boundary Waters Treaty contains strong standards for transboundary water pollution, it does not provide a role
for citizens to force compliance or resolve potential disputes
through the IJC. Thus, if the federal governments choose to
jointly ignore an environmental problem or resolve it without citizen input, citizens have no recourse under the Boundary Waters
Treaty or through new mechanisms such as the NAAEC.
Despite some shortcomings, the NAAEC citizen submission
process holds promise for improving compliance through citizen
participation. Citizens have another formal mechanism to allege
enforcement failures, and the publishing of factual records could
create increased pressure to motivate governmental action. Professor Raustiala describes this as a "fire alarm" function which
has some value in dispersing information regarding environmental enforcement. 79 It is too early to gauge the ultimate effectiveness of the citizen submission process, but, according to a leading
scholar on the subject, "many of the submitters who have used the
process appear to believe that it has helped to engender important
changes in government enforcement behavior."1 80
V.

CONCLUSION

The GLWQA, the Air Quality Agreement, and the NAAEC
give citizens an increased role in achieving compliance with the
international environmental law regime. An obvious criticism is
that the agreements fail to give citizens the ability to obtain a legally enforceable judgment to prevent international environmental harms, enforce standards, or obtain damages for past harms.
This criticism, however, may be unfair in the context of international environmental law compliance. These agreements-as is
common in international environmental law-rely on mechanisms
177. Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, at 7, SEM-06-002 (Devils Lake), (Aug. 21,
2006), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/06-2-DETN-en.pdf.
178. Id.
179. Raustiala, supra note 171, at 269.
180. Markell, supra note 113, at 791.
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other than traditional legal enforcement to ensure compliance.
These mechanisms should not be dismissed as just a poor substitute for legal enforcement. Professor Edith Brown Weiss notes
that compliance in international environmental law can take
many forms:
Lawyers frequently point to the remedies available to enforce
binding agreements, such as judicial and other methods of adjudication, as an important distinguishing characteristic of binding agreements that affects compliance. But, there are other
strategies available to encourage compliance that could apply to
binding as well as nonbinding instruments. These strategies include various financial, diplomatic, and other incentives or blandishments, as well as coercive measures. Moreover, the
institutional structure available to assist countries and nongovernmental actors in monitoring compliance may be as important
as whether the instruments are binding. 181
In this context, absent traditional legal enforcement, citizen
participation is even more critical to ensure compliance. These
agreements were entered into in response to citizen pressure and
may only be as valuable as citizens make them. While scholars
continue to debate whether judicial enforcement is preferable to
other compliance mechanisms in international law,' 8 2 the question may be politically moot. It is highly unlikely that the United
States would soon enter into a binding international treaty that
subjects it-or its industries-to international adjudication to enforce environmental standards. Perhaps the day will come when
national sovereignty gives way to international environmental
law, but that day is not here yet. On the contrary, the United
States may be moving away from that approach rather than towards it.
Taking a historical view, it could be argued that the heyday of
international adjudication for environmental law came and went
in the first half of the twentieth century. The Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 created a mechanism for binding arbitration and
even provided for the use of an umpire, chosen in accordance with
the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907, if the IJC deadlocked.18 3 While not available to citizens and never invoked in the
181.
182.
Brown
183.

Weiss, supra note 21, at 1569.
See generally INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith
Weiss et al. eds., 1997).
See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 8, art. X, 36 Stat. at 2453.
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history of treaty, the mere inclusion of binding international adjudication is remarkable when compared to the lack of enforcement
provisions in the United States-Canadian international environmental agreements of the past several decades.
The Trail Smelter arbitration also remains a historical anomaly, as such a dispute would likely be addressed through domestic
litigation today.1 8 4 With liberalization of jurisdictional rules in
both countries and the growth of environmental enforcement opportunities under domestic law, citizens no longer need to rely on
their federal governments to seek a remedy for transboundary pollution.' 8 5 In fact, when citizens recently sought to remedy transboundary water pollution from the same Trail Smelter facility at
issue in the original arbitration, they sued the company in United
States federal court under United States domestic environmental
86
law.1
Looking to the future, is the growing role of citizens in international environmental law compliance going to lead to supranational adjudication with citizens bringing enforcement actions
against foreign governments in international courts? Most likely
it will not, at least in the relatively short time period in which
society must address numerous pressing international environmental issues. If the yardstick for measuring the role of citizens
in compliance is a right to legally enforceable supranational adjudication, then the United States-Canadian international environmental law regime comes up short. However, success can be
demonstrated in numerous other ways, such as a citizenry that is
more educated and engaged in international environmental issues, governments that are more responsive to international environmental concerns, and private actors that are more respectful of
the international environmental commons. Anecdotes can be offered from both sides as to whether this is occurring, but absent
much needed empirical studies on the subject, conclusions would
be speculative. Perhaps demanding evidence of such successes
should be the next step in the evolving role of citizens in international environmental compliance.
184. See Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution:Harmonizing Internationaland
Domestic Law, 40 U. MIcH. J. L. REFORM 681 (2007).
185. See id.; Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
186. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1070 n.5, 1082
(9th Cir. 2006) (The claim involved the United States Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2001)).
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